

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 04807 01 OF 02 081742Z  
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-07 OMB-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00  
PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01  
PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 DHA-02 IO-13 EB-08  
NRC-05 OES-06 FEAE-00 ERDA-05 /105 W  
-----081832Z 127897 /43

R 081600Z APR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6064

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 4807

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OGEN  
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH ARBATOV ON SALT AND RELATED MATTERS

1. DURING APRIL 6 LUNCH AT SPASO HOUSE, DIRECTOR OF USA  
INSTITUTE ARBATOV MADE A NUMBER OF COMMENTS ON THE CURRENT STATUS  
OF SALT NEGOTIATIONS AND SEVERAL OTHER MATTERS. ARBATOV IS  
SCHEDULED TO DEPART APRIL 8 FOR A TRIP TO NEW YORK, BOSTON AND  
WASHINGTON. THE GIST OF HIS EXCHANGES WITH THE AMBASSADOR  
IS SUMMARIZED BELOW.

2. SALT: ARBATOV ASKED AMBASSADOR'S ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE  
PROSPECTS FOR SALT. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WAS  
DISTURBED BY THE IMPLICATION IN SOVIET PRESS COVERAGE OF  
THE VANCE MISSION THAT THE BALL IS IN THE U.S. COURT. THIS  
IS UNHELPFUL ATTITUDE, SINCE THE U.S. CLEARLY EXPECTS SOME  
SUGGESTIONS FROM SOVIET SIDE.

3. ARBATOV RETORTED THAT SOVIET PROPOSALS HAD BEEN MADE,  
AND THAT NEW ADMINISTRATION SEEMS INCLINED TO IGNORE  
THEM. ASKED DIRECTLY WHEN THESE PROPOSALS WERE MADE,  
ARBATOV SAID "IN 1976, AND ALSO BEFORE VANCE VISIT." ARBATOV  
THEN SAID THAT THE PROPOSALS BROUGHT BY THE SECRETARY MADE  
A BAD IMPRESSION BECAUSE:  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 04807 01 OF 02 081742Z

(A) SOVIETS HAD ALREADY SPECIFICALLY REJECTED THE  
DEFERRAL OPTION, AND WERE SURPRISED THAT IT WOULD BE  
RAISED AGAIN;

(B) THE COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL WAS VERY COMPLEX  
AND GIVES APPEARANCE THAT THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT

AND THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH FOLLOWED IT HAVE SIMPLY BEEN CAST ASIDE BY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. IT WAS INTERPRETED AS A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT PROPOSITION AND, FURTHERMORE, U.S. PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE IT APPEAR THAT AN ANSWER WAS REQUIRED IN THREE DAYS.

4. THE AMBASSADOR COMMENTED THAT, WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT WAS A PACKAGE PROPOSAL, IT WAS NOT CONCEIVED AS A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT PROPOSITION: WE COULD WELL UNDERSTAND THE NECESSITY FOR NEGOTIATING THE PRECISE NUMBERS. NOR DID WE EXPECT OR ASK FOR A DEFINITIVE REPLY IN THREE DAYS; WE DID CONSIDER IT REASONABLE TO EXPECT A DISCUSSION OF THOSE ELEMENTS WHICH THE SOVIETS FIND DISTURBING, AND ALSO COUNTERPROPOSALS FROM THE SOVIETS.

5. ARBATOV SAID THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT INTEND TO REJECT ALL THE ELEMENTS IN THE PACKAGE; SOME CLEARLY CAN BE DISCUSSED, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS ARE SIMPLY NOT PREPARED TO DISCARD THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT AND START OVER. HE REMARKED THAT THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT WAS THE RESULT OF "LONG, ARDUOUS WORK" ON BOTH SIDES AND REPRESENTED A CAREFUL BALANCING OF INTERESTS. IF THE WORK DONE ON IT IS SIMPLY CAST ASIDE, A QUESTION IS RAISED AS TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE U.S. IN DESIRING TO ACHIEVE A BALANCED AGREEMENT. EVEN ASIDE FROM THE SUBSTANCE OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS, HE ADDED, THE SOVIETS ARE NOT PREPARED TO TURN THEIR BACKS ON VLADIVOSTOK.

6. THE AMBASSADOR COMMENTED THAT, WHILE THE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT DOES GO BEYOND VLADIVOSTOK, IT IS NOT FAIR TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 04807 01 OF 02 081742Z

CHARACTERIZE IT AS DISCARDING VLADIVOSTOK. THE U.S. IS SERIOUS ABOUT ACHIEVING REAL REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC ARMS, AND VIEWS THE COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL AS AN EQUITABLE FRAMEWORK TO BRING THIS ABOUT.

7. ARBATOV REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT REJECT LOWER LEVELS PER SE; A CERTAIN REDUCTION OF THE VLADIVOSTOK NUMBERS MAY BE POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, THERE IS A POINT OF REDUCTION (WHICH HE DID NOT DEFINE) BEYOND WHICH U.S. FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS BECOME HIGHLY RELEVANT TO THE SOVIETS. TO MAKE AN EXTREME ASSUMPTION, HE CONTINUED, IF IT WERE AGREED THAT STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WOULD BE REDUCED TO ZERO, THE U.S. WOULD RETAIN THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AROUND THE SOVIET PERIPHERY WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF REACHING THE USSR. THIS FACTOR CANNOT BE LEFT OUT OF THE EQUATION IF WE DISCUSS LEVELS SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER THAN THOSE EMBODIED IN THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT.

8. THE CRUISE MISSILE, ARBATOV SAID, MAKES THE QUESTION EVEN

MORE DIFFICULT, SINCE WITH FBS AND CRUISE MISSILES, THE U.S. COULD POSE A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION EVEN IF OTHER STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WERE ABOLISHED. THE AMBASSADOR REMINDED ARBATOV THAT WE ARE NOT REFUSING TO DISCUSS LIMITATIONS ON THE CRUISE MISSILE; INDEED SUCH LIMITATIONS ARE A PART OF OUR COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE.

9. IN CONCLUSION ARBATOV SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW FUTURE PROSPECTS DEPEND LARGELY ON U.S. ACTIONS. THE AMBASSADOR COUNTERED THAT THE ACTIONS OF BOTH SIDES ARE IMPORTANT.

10. STYLE OF CARTER ADMINISTRATION: ARBATOV MENTIONED - AS HAS BEEN HIS HABIT OF LATE - THE DIFFICULTY THE SOVIETS HAVE IN UNDERSTANDING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE NEW STYLE OF OPEN DIPLOMACY CREATED PROBLEMS OF ADJUSTMENT FOR THE SOVIETS, AND HE REMARKED THAT WHILE HE HIMSELF IS AN ADVOCATE OF RELATIVELY OPEN DIPLOMACY, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 04807 01 OF 02 081742Z

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 04807 02 OF 02 081732Z  
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-07 OMB-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 DHA-02 IO-13 EB-08

NRC-05 OES-06 FEAE-00 ERDA-05 /105 W

-----081833Z 127768 /44

R 081600Z APR 77

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6065

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 4807

HE BELIEVES THAT A CERTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY MUST BE PRESERVED, PARTICULARLY IN THE EARLY STAGES OF NEGOTIATION, IN ORDER TO AVOID UNNECESSARY PROBLEMS IN REACHING COMPROMISES. HE ASKED WHAT WAS MEANT BY THE TERM "GOOD FAITH," AND WHETHER IT DIFFERS FROM "SINCERITY." (HIS IMPLICATION WAS THAT THE GOOD FAITH OR SINCERITY OF THE NEW

ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN CALLED INTO QUESTION HERE.) HE WAS TOLD THAT NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH MEANS ESSENTIALLY THAT A GENUINE INTEREST IS PRESENT IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT. THE AMBASSADOR ADDED THAT ANOTHER ASPECT OF GOOD FAITH - AT LEAST FROM THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW - IS CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THE RESULTS WILL NOT BE REJECTED BY THE U.S. PUBLIC AND CONGRESS.

11. PUBLIC OPINION. THIS LED TO A DISCUSSION OF THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE TWO COUNTRIES, WITH ARBATOV MAINTAINING THAT PUBLIC OPINION IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN SOVIET CALCULATIONS AS WELL. ARBATOV SAID THAT WE PAY GREAT ATTENTION TO DEALING WITH PUBLIC OPINION IN THE U.S., BUT TEND TO IGNORE THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE PROBLEMS ON THIS SCORE AS WELL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT PUBLIC OPINION HERE IS EXPRESSED LESS OPENLY AND IN DIFFERENT WAYS. THE AMBASSADOR OBSERVED THAT, WHILE NO ONE WOULD DENY THAT THERE IS PUBLIC OPINION IN THE SOVIET UNION OR THAT IT PLAYS A CERTAIN ROLE, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 04807 02 OF 02 081732Z

IT DOES PRESENT A MORE MANAGEABLE PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIETS. HE ASSUMED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT ON SALT THE SOVIET MILITARY LEADERS MUST BE CONVINCED THAT DEALS ARE ACCEPTABLE, BUT THAT THE PUBLIC AS A WHOLE SEEMS DISPOSED TO ACCEPT THE JUDGMENT OF THE LEADERSHIP.

12. HUMAN RIGHTS. ARBATOV SAID THAT THE CONTROVERSY OVER HUMAN RIGHTS HAD NOT AFFECTED THE SOVIET DECISION ON SALT IN THE SENSE THAT THE SECRETARY'S PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE BEEN RECEIVED MORE FAVORABLY IF THE ISSUE HAD NOT ARISEN. THESE PROPOSALS HAD BEEN REJECTED ON THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET PERCEPTION THAT THEY WERE ONE-SIDED. HOWEVER, THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONTROVERSY HAD "CONDITIONED" THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO EXPECT THE WORST, AND BY RAISING THE LEVEL OF SUSPICION, HAD PERHAPS MADE THE SOVIET DECISION QUICKER AND EASIER.

13. COMMENT: WE CAN EXPECT ARBATOV TO PURVEY THE LINE OUTLINED ABOVE DURING HIS STAY IN THE U.S. HE AND HIS SENIOR STAFFERS SEEM VERY WELL INFORMED ON THE SOVIET SALT POSITION, AND ALTHOUGH THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO BE CONSULTED REGARDING DETAILS OF NEGOTIATION, THEY PRESUMABLY DO PROVIDE ADVICE TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ON U.S. REACTIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. POLICY. REGARDING HIS CURRENT VISIT TO THE U.S., ARBATOV MADE IT CLEAR THAT ONE OF HIS PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES IS TO ASSESS THE TREND OF POLICY UNDER THE NEW ADMINISTRATION. HE WILL PRESUMABLY SEEK SOME HIGH-LEVEL APPOINTMENTS WHILE IN WASHINGTON, AND IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR OFFICIALS WHO MEET HIM TO IMPRESS UPON HIM THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR COMMITMENT TO SUBSTANTIAL AND EQUITABLE REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS

SYSTEMS AS WELL AS THE DEPTH AND NATURE OF OUR DEDICATION TO  
THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. ARBATOV, AS DEPT AWARE, SEEMS  
CONVINCED THAT OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POSTURE IS CALCULATED ANTI-  
SOVIET CAMPAIGN.  
TOON

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Sent Date:** 08-Apr-1977 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Date:** 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1977MOSCOW04807  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D770123-0591  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** MOSCOW  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1977/newtext/t19770474/aaaacmoz.tel  
**Line Count:** 228  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** b00249a8-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 21-Oct-2004 12:00:00 am  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 2858669  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** CONVERSATION WITH ARBATOV ON SALT AND RELATED MATTERS  
**TAGS:** OGEN  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/b00249a8-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009